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During the seventy years since India became independent, every other 
new democracy in South Asia has fallen prey at least once to a military 
takeover or a devastating civil war, and some have experienced both. 
Among the region’s countries, only India has escaped these scourges. 
That neither has occurred in India owes much to the design and evo-
lution of its federal system, and to the institutionalized recognition of 
diversity that is a basic aspect of the Republic of India’s constitutional 
structure. Although Indian federalism’s record as a mode of ethnic ac-
commodation is not without blemish, it is likely that far worse would 
have happened without federalism.
Critics of federalism charge that it has held back India’s socioeco-
nomic development. Some scholars argue that federalism is among the 
reasons why India’s central government has not been a stronger force in 
steering national development since 1947.1 Others suggest that a more 
centralized India could have done more to shrink social and econom-
ic inequalities. Coordinating nationwide economic policy is hard in a 
country with so many sites and levels of political authority, all the more 
so since the turn to political and economic decentralization in the early 
1990s. Coalition governments at the center have often needed the loy-
alty of regional parties, adding the challenges of alliance politics to the 
already complex process of national decision making. The governments 
of the 29 states, meanwhile, have much autonomy and often lack incen-
tives to work with the central government for the sake of national goals. 
The elections of 2014, however, may have marked a turning point. 
The elections of that year saw the Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian Peo-
ple’s Party or BJP) win a parliamentary majority in its own right, the 
first such majority in decades. Currently, the BJP heads an alliance that 
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controls a dominant share of seats in the 545-member Lok Sabha, the 
lower house of Parliament. The BJP’s chief, 66-year-old Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi, projects himself as a strong national leader who gets 
things done. After a quarter-century of decentralization and national co-
alition governments dependent on smaller parties whose appeal often 
reached no farther than a single region or state, a third of the Indian 
electorate (enough to produce a majority of seats in India’s fragmented 
electoral landscape) were attracted by the image of national leadership 
that Modi offered.
Under Modi, to an extent that may seem surprising for a prime min-
ister who had previously been chief minister of a state, the relationship 
between national and local power looks much the way it did under 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1966–77, 1980–84) of the Indian Na-
tional Congress (INC or Congress party). As Paul Brass wrote in 1984, 
rather than building national power from below through the “careful, 
patient cultivation of linkages from top to bottom through bargaining, 
compromise and exchange,” Indira Gandhi tried to “bypass the persist-
ing structures of government, local, and group power through appeals 
to large categories of voters on transcendent or very dramatic issues.” 
In short, she relied on a “politics of crisis that plays upon or manufac-
tures dramatic issues.”2 
Such dramas have been commonplace under Modi. In late September 
2016, his government announced that it had launched armed “surgical 
strikes” against terrorists along the Line of Control, the heavily fenced 
and mined de facto border that separates India from Pakistan in the dis-
puted state of Jammu and Kashmir.3 In early November came the sudden 
announcement of demonetization, as Modi withdrew huge amounts of 
currency from circulation while citing a desire to choke off counterfeit-
ing, terrorist financing, tax evasion, and other illegal activities. 
With the BJP attaining a level of political dominance not seen for 
decades, federalism is again likely to come to the fore as a crucial check 
on central overreach. As under Indira Gandhi in the 1980s, there will be 
conflicts, whether new or reawakened. Yet Paul Brass’s conclusion from 
more than three decades ago remains relevant: “The system [of Indian 
federalism] will not move decisively in one way or another . . . [since] 
national power is extremely difficult to build and maintain because of 
the enormous size, diversity, and fragmentation of the country.”4 
A Force for Democratic Consolidation
As many have noted, India’s brand of federalism gives the central 
government strong powers. These include the ability to redraw state bor-
ders, as well as emergency provisions for converting the country into a 
unitary state and suspending state governments in favor of direct gov-
ernance from the center (known as President’s Rule). The Constitution 
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of 1950, moreover, eschews the words “federal” or “federalism.” These 
facts led the constitutional scholar K.C. Wheare to call India’s system 
only “quasi-federal, not strictly federal.”5  
The Constitution was written after the bloody trauma of the 1947 
partition—it may have killed as many as two-million people—and the 
start of India’s long-running conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir. The 
provisions giving the central government in Delhi residual powers and 
potent emergency prerogatives reflect the framers’ desire to ensure 
that India would always have the institutional means to deal with a 
sudden crisis. 
The overarching priority was to build an independent, sovereign Indi-
an nation. At the height of the nationalist struggle, Congress party lead-
ers had backed the redrawing of state borders to comport more closely 
with regional linguistic identities. After 1947, however, this idea was 
dropped in favor of keeping borders unchanged for fear of fueling pa-
rochial tendencies that might threaten national unity. The first map of 
newly independent India thus represented an amalgam of the borders 
of the old princely states and British provinces rather than following 
linguistic lines. Even so, special constitutional provisions gave wide 
measures of autonomy to majority-tribal areas in the northeastern and 
central parts of the country. Jammu and Kashmir received a special form 
of autonomy pending resolution of the conflict there.
The framers knew that they were devising something different from 
the usual run of federal systems, and few among them dissented from 
the compromise that the Constituent Assembly had forged. Speaking 
at the third reading of the constitutional draft, Thakur Das Bhargava 
described the system as “unitary-cum-federal” because of the central 
government’s “very wide” powers.6 Another member of the Constituent 
Assembly, M. Thirumala Rao, explained that “we wanted to have a fed-
eral Constitution but we have produced a Constitution that is mostly uni-
tary.” He listed the problems that had weighed on the framers, includ-
ing the “danger zone” of Kashmir, and affirmed their decision that “the 
residuary powers of this nation should rest with a Government which is 
strong in the Centre.”7
Strong central powers also seemed likely to aid the consolidation of 
democracy. As Annie Mascarene said in the Constituent Assembly:
We are at the advent of democracy. Democracy has got a tendency to let 
loose fickle emotions and disruptive forces. In the circumstances without 
a strong Centre I do not think we can have a successful democracy. We 
are at the beginning of nation-building. We have to survive as a nation. 
The question is the survival of a nation in a world of international con-
flicts. If that is so, we have to decide in favour of a strong Centre.8
Yet limits on central powers remained, and the system had important 
differences from unitary rule. Emergency powers, noted Alladi Krish-
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naswami Ayyar, “cannot by their very nature be of normal or ordinary 
occurrence.”9 Citing India’s sheer size and complexity, future cabinet 
minister N.V. Gadgil explained:
It is impossible to govern a country so big, with so many traditions and 
with such a variety of cultures with about two hundred and twenty differ-
ent languages and to bring them in one administrative unit in the sense 
that there would be one unitary State, one legislature and one executive.10
Over time, the idea toward which Gadgil was gesturing—that of one 
country encompassing a wealth of different traditions and cultures, and 
often described as “unity in diversity”— would increasingly appear as a 
central pillar of Indian national identity. The most significant reflection 
of this has been the redrawing of internal borders to provide regional 
linguistic communities with states of their own such as Andhra Pradesh 
(created in 1953), Karnataka and Kerala (1956), Gujarat and Maharash-
tra (1960), and Haryana and Punjab (1966). Along troubled sections of 
India’s international frontiers, moreover, Delhi has experimented with 
various kinds of autonomy arrangements in hopes of settling or at least 
partially taming old conflicts.
Making New States
The Constitution allows Parliament in New Delhi to change any 
state’s borders unilaterally—there is no requirement for any state-level 
referendum or even the approval of the state legislative assembly. This 
was one of the reasons why Wheare and others qualified their descrip-
tions of India as a federal system. Creating new states is easier in India 
than elsewhere because Parliament’s upper house, the 245-member Ra-
jya Sabha (House of States), does not represent existing states equally, 
like the U.S. Senate, but rather has 233 seats that are apportioned on the 
basis of states’ respective populations (an additional dozen seats go to 
presidential appointees). The advent of a new Indian state, therefore, 
bodes no shift in the balance of power among states.11 This arrangement, 
unusual among federal systems, has allowed Delhi to respond flexibly to 
demands for recognition and self-governance made by regionally con-
centrated linguistic or cultural-nationalist groups. 
The most significant rearrangement of India’s internal borders took 
place in the 1950s to meet demands from southern and western linguis-
tic groups that wanted states of their own. Prime Minister Jawaharlal 
Nehru had opposed the linguistic organization of state borders in 1947, 
but shifted gears in December 1952. A local leader, Potti Sriramalu, had 
died during a hunger strike in favor of a Telugu-speaking state that he 
had wanted to see carved from what was then the state of Madras, and 
riots had broken out. Along with conceding the creation of this state 
(Andhra Pradesh) in 1953, Nehru set up an independent commission to 
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study other statehood demands. That body’s recommendations underlay 
the States Reorganisation Act of 1956. 
The net effect was to promote the consolidation of India’s fledgling 
democracy. The change also helped to preserve the Congress party’s 
electoral dominance: Linguistic reorganization undercut the rationales 
for a number of local parties that drew votes away from Congress.12 
Subsequent episodes of reorganization took place in the far northeast 
in the 1970s and 1980s, accompanied by experimentation with various 
asymmetric devices to protect the cultural autonomy of tribal groups. 
In 2000, three new states—Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Uttara-
khand—were created in the Hindi-speaking heartland of north-central 
India by the BJP-led central government. Their creation was made pos-
sible by the decline in upper-caste dominance that had long held back 
statehood demands in these areas.13 In all instances stretching back to 
the 1950s, the creation of new states has taken place not only peace-
fully, but with the express consent of the relevant “parent” states. It was 
not until 2014, when the state of Telangana was created from Andhra 
Pradesh (India’s very first “linguistic” state), that a new state came into 
being against the wishes of its parent state. Despite vehement opposi-
tion, the process of bifurcation itself was largely peaceful. 
The creation of new states has helped to embed democracy within 
India’s wide array of distinct regional cultures. The salient identities 
(whether having to do with caste, tribe, language, or religion), along 
with the social bases of political power, policy cultures, and local issues, 
all differ from state to state. Achieving a closer fit between local identi-
ties and political borders has encouraged what Lucia Michelutti calls the 
“vernacularisation” of democracy.14 By removing language from the list 
of political grievances, the linguistic reorganization of state boundaries 
has allowed democracy within individual states to be more pluralistic. 
When engaging in politics, voters can draw fluidly on multiple identi-
ties—they may think first of their caste and religion, or they may give 
priority to some other concern (their interests as farmers, for instance). 
Federalism has also served to confine identity-related conflicts with-
in state boundaries. With the partial exception of religion, most of the 
identities that figure in electoral politics tend to be salient at the level 
of individual states rather than at the national level. Thus cleavages that 
could be destabilizing at an all-India level are kept at a lower level: 
What happens in the states tends to stay in the states. The spirals of eth-
nic outbidding that have distorted the politics of other postcolonial de-
mocracies in South Asia and beyond have been largely absent in India.15 
The flexible adaptation of federalism has therefore been a critical 
factor in India’s democratic consolidation. For this reason, students of 
federalism have increasingly come to see India as having a distinctive 
type of federalism that well suits a multiethnic country with almost two-
dozen constitutionally recognized languages.16 
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State Year
Established
Population 
in Millions
Primary Official 
Language(s)
Telangana 2014 35.2 Telugu, Urdu
Chhattisgarh 2000 25.5 Hindi, Chhattisgarhi
Jharkhand 2000 33.0 Hindi
Uttarakhand 2000 10.1 Hindi
Arunachal Pradesh 1987 1.4 English
Mizoram 1987 1.1 Mizo, English, Hindi
Goa 1987 1.5 Konkani
Sikkim 1975 0.6 English
Tripura 1972 3.7 Bengali, English, Kokborok
Meghalaya 1972 3.0 English
Manipur 1972 2.7 Meitei (Manipuri)
Himachal Pradesh 1971 6.9 Hindi
Haryana 1966 25.4 Hindi
Punjab 1966 27.7 Punjabi
Nagaland 1963 2.0 English
Gujarat 1960 60.4 Gujarati
Maharashtra 1960 112.4 Marathi
Madhya Pradesh 1956 72.6 Hindi
Rajasthan 1956 68.6 Hindi
Karnataka 1956 61.1 Kannada
Kerala 1956 33.4 Malayalam
Andhra Pradesh 1953 49.5 Telugu
Assam 1950 31.2 Assamese
West Bengal 1950 91.3 Bengali
Bihar 1950 104.1 Hindi
Uttar Pradesh 1950 199.8 Hindi
Odisha 1950 42.0 Odia
Tamil Nadu 1950 72.1 Tamil
Jammu and Kashmir 1950 12.5 Urdu
Source: Population data from India Census 2011, http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011-prov-
results/census2011_PPT_paper1.html. 
Note: Table does not include India’s seven Union Territories.
Table—InDIan STaTeS, by year eSTablISeD
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As a force for democratic consolidation, however, Indian federalism 
does have its limits. These have been most starkly evident in the border 
regions of the northeast and the Kashmir Valley. There, security con-
cerns and expedients adopted to resolve conflicts have sometimes either 
strengthened local autocracies17 or overridden federalism altogether, 
leaving Delhi and the army in charge. In the northeast, frequent grants 
of special recognition or enhanced self-governance to certain groups 
have promoted a violent and destabilizing cascade of autonomy claims. 
While such flexible federal arrangements have soothed the hilly states 
of Mizoram and Nagaland, they have not worked so well in the more 
densely peopled and heterogeneous plains of the region where, for in-
stance, ongoing demands for statehood by the Bodo ethnic group have 
involved violent conflict.18 
Is the Center Too Weak?
If Indian federalism, on balance, has been good at fostering ethnic ac-
commodation and regionally embedded democratic cultures, what about 
the charge that it has held back national economic development, particu-
larly as the party system has become more regionalized? 
The roots of regionalization and the end of the Congress party’s long 
stint as the hub of nationwide political competition can be traced back to 
Indira Gandhi’s time as prime minister. As challenges to her centralized 
leadership mounted in the 1970s and 1980s, she mishandled conflicts 
stretching across the northern marches of India from Assam to Kashmir 
to Punjab. Farther south, in Andhra Pradesh, the Telugu Desam Party 
rode its call for regional autonomy and its critique of corrupt central 
leadership to a win over Congress in the 1983 state elections. Indira 
Gandhi chose to interpret demands for regional autonomy as person-
al attacks, while relations between Delhi and the states became a pole 
around which non-Congress forces began to coalesce. 
Lower-caste citizens, especially those belonging to the Other Back-
ward Classes (OBCs), began to support new regional parties that cam-
paigned for the extension of affirmative action. Two of these parties, 
the Samajwadi Party and the Rashtriya Janata Dal (both offshoots of 
the earlier Janata Dal or People’s Party), profoundly altered the politics 
of the impoverished and heavily populated northern states of Bihar and 
Uttar Pradesh, home to nearly a quarter of all Indians. By 1989, politi-
cal regionalization had reached such a pitch that general elections were 
best read as amalgamating a slew of state-level verdicts rather than as 
reflecting some single “national mood.”19 From 1989 to 2014, no one 
party could win a majority in the Indian Parliament. As poorer, lower-
caste voters participated in rising numbers, the states became the place 
where the political action was.
Since the early 1990s, political decentralization and economic lib-
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eralization have made the states stronger still. The end of the central 
government’s role in licensing businesses and industries (known as 
the “permit raj”), a reform adopted in 1991, replaced the old game of 
center-regional bargaining with a contest among the states to attract 
investment. India went from a centralized command economy to a fed-
eral market economy in which the central government plays a mostly 
regulatory role and no longer intervenes directly in the economies of 
the states.20 State governments and their chief ministers have taken 
center stage. Investors, foreign and domestic, who are interested in 
India now go not to New Delhi, but straight to the states. 
States have a number of tools with which to woo investment. Their 
ability to provide key inputs such as land, electric power, utilities, and 
access to natural resources is important. Differences in the regulatory 
and business climate from state to state go a long way toward explaining 
why some parts of India are economically dynamic while others struggle 
with slower growth. Prime Minister Modi led the BJP’s successful 2014 
parliamentary campaign by pointing to the strong growth record that 
Gujarat built up during his long spell (2001–14) as chief minister of its 
BJP government.
The twin processes of decentralization—political and economic—
have made Indian states more autonomous. The growth of regional par-
ties, and their involvement in national coalition governments from the 
1980s to 2014, has helped to establish checks on the arbitrary use of 
central power. After 1994, for instance, invocations of President’s Rule 
to dismiss opposition-run state governments markedly declined. Greater 
state autonomy has made chief ministers more powerful. Growth has 
filled state coffers and given chief ministers many ways to improve their 
standing with voters. 
Even as power has flowed away from New Delhi, it has become cen-
tralized within states as chief ministers have used new resources to craft 
new programs. Not all of this has happened licitly: States’ new regulato-
ry powers under the economic-liberalization regime have allowed chief 
ministers to collect rents and set up shady funding streams for use in 
managing the political process.21 State-level elections were once known 
as tough for incumbents to win, but this pattern gave way in the 2000s 
to the phenomenon of the chief minister with a secure grip on office 
(Modi in Gujarat being a case in point). The shrewdest chief ministers 
even learned how to leverage the states’ role as primary implementers 
of many policies to steal credit for popular programs whose plans and 
resources in fact came from New Delhi.
Within this decentralized landscape, national politicians have of-
ten pointed to federalism as an impediment to stronger, more efficient 
central-government decision making. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, 
speaking in 2007 as head of the Congress-led United Progressive Al-
liance (UPA) that was in power at the time, lamented that even with 
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“national parties dominating the political scene. . . . the management 
of Centre-state relations can give rise to serious tensions.”22 And at that 
moment, national parties were not actually all that dominant. Singh’s 
own Congress party, long the colossus of Indian politics, had in 2004 
won in its own right just 145 Lok Sabha seats—well short of a major-
ity—and thus depended on a congeries of smaller regional parties, as 
well as the Left Front, in order to build a governing coalition. 
The Congress party improved its own seat share to 206 in 2009, but 
the resulting UPA government (still led by Singh) became mired in a 
number of corruption scandals as well as a growth slowdown near the 
end of its term. The BJP complained about what it said was decision-
making paralysis in New Delhi, and geared up for the looming 2014 
contest by promising voters that it would make the federal system  work 
more smoothly for the sake of national goals. The BJP platform also 
called for holding national, state, and local elections at the same time in 
order to end “policy paralysis.” 
Discussions of federalism per se may not reach voters, but there is lit-
tle doubt that part of Modi’s appeal stems from his projection of strong, 
national power. So far, Modi’s leadership style has alienated state gov-
ernments that are not run by his BJP, making the vision of genuinely 
cooperative federalism—of the center and the states working together as 
“Team India”—seem chimerical. Yet certain major, long-discussed re-
forms (they have been on the table longer than Modi has been in Delhi) 
have been agreed on. Perhaps the most significant is the new Goods and 
Services Tax (GST). This will bring all indirect taxes in India under one 
common regime, and remove the ability of states to set their own taxes 
on interstate commerce. The implementation of the GST, however, has 
been beset by wrangling between the center and the states, and the sys-
tem of rates is messier than was originally envisaged. In 2017, after the 
BJP’s sweeping win in the Uttar Pradesh state election, leader writers 
again called on Narendra Modi to use his party’s dominance to enact 
further economic reforms.23 But such appeals increasingly are premised 
on the BJP’s own electoral dominance rather than on Modi’s ability to 
bring the center and the states together around a shared platform. 
There are good reasons to doubt that federalism and multiparty gov-
ernments are the main roadblock to making and implementing tough 
policy decisions. Strategic political leadership—or its lack—matters 
just as much. Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao (1991–96) had the vi-
sion to initiate and the skill to sustain economic liberalization, unfazed 
by his status as head of a minority government.24 Yet despite examples 
such as Rao’s, the perception runs deep in India that divided centers of 
power paralyze governance, and this may feed the public’s appetite for 
strong leadership. In the World Values Survey, only Russia and Ro-
mania exceed India in expressed level of support for “having a strong 
leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections.” More 
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than 70 percent of Indian respondents agreed that this would be a “fairly 
good” or “very good” thing.25 
Narendra Modi’s current political dominance reflects the extent to 
which he, more so than his party, has captured the popular imagination. 
Modi has carefully constructed a 
national appeal around his own 
leadership. He plays to Hindu-
nationalist sentiment and also to 
the broader desire for prosperity 
and development, seeking to push 
aside state-specific factors.26 As 
noted earlier, he resembles Indira 
Gandhi in his nationalization of 
political debate through a politics 
of drama and crisis. Yet even in 
2017, when the big story was the 
dominance that the Modi-led BJP 
showed in state elections across 
the country, those elections were still decisively shaped by local factors. 
Federalism in India has been the product of a compromise, but that 
compromise was necessary. The framers of the 1950 Constitution, liv-
ing in the shadow of independent India’s birth trauma and desperate to 
avoid anything like a reprise of partition with its mass bloodshed and 
legions of refugees, valued national cohesion above all. Hence their re-
solve to set down on paper something that had many unitary elements. 
Yet federalism was the effectual truth of that regime from the outset. 
Over the last seven decades, it has shown itself able to evolve institu-
tionally in response to the pressures of nation- and state-building, and 
has thereby played a critical role in democratic consolidation. The pow-
er of the center has ebbed and flowed since independence, but the ter-
ritorial institutions of federalism have endured, helping to keep conflicts 
from hardening along geographic fault lines that could split India and 
imperil democracy. 
Is that enough, however? In addition to the other benefits that fed-
eralism offers, Indians expect it to be good for development too. The 
fragmentation of the party landscape over the quarter-century before 
2014 boosted the number of potential veto players, as did the empower-
ment of state governments following decentralization in the early 1990s. 
Central authority, in other words, is not what it once was. Federalism 
has gone hand-in-hand with, and helped to sustain, substantial regional 
inequalities that have caused the quality of democracy to vary across the 
breadth of India. Yet in evaluating federalism we must not lose sight of 
the reasons why it came into being, or assume that if the impediments 
to central authority vanished tomorrow, neither democracy nor develop-
ment would suffer any peril. 
The framers of the 1950 
Constitution, living in the 
shadow of independent 
India’s birth trauma and 
desperate to avoid anything 
like a reprise of partition 
with its mass bloodshed and 
legions of refugees, valued 
national cohesion above all.
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As India enters a period of single-party dominance on the national 
level, and as concerns grow about the implications of majoritarian na-
tionalism, federalism remains a critical arena within which political and 
institutional checks and balances can do their work. The national has 
not supplanted the local as the theater of Indian politics. Will federalism 
and the rights of states become rallying points for those who oppose the 
BJP? We cannot yet say. What we can predict with confidence is that 
the states’ crucial role in economic life, and the new era of tax-policy 
cooperation heralded by the GST, mean that federalism will remain cen-
tral to understanding the evolution of both democracy and development 
in the years to come.
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